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"SHE'S NOBODY'S CHILD/THE LAW CAN'T TOUCH HER AT ALL":
SEEKING TO BRING DIGNITY TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
INVOLVING JUVENILES'
Michael L. Perlin and Alison J. Lynch

Inquiries into a range of issues involving juveniles in the psychiatric hospitalization and criminal trial process reveal that, regularly, juveniles are subject to shame and humiliation in all aspects of the legal system that relate to arrest, trial, conviction, and
institutionalization, shame and humiliation that are often exacerbated in cases involving racial minorities and those who are
economically impoverished. We contextualize them into the juvenile justice system, and look specifically at how this is
reflected in the case law. We then consider these findings through the filters of therapeutic jurisprudence and international
human rights laws, concluding that these approaches best remediate the current state of affairs and infuse this system with
badly-needed dignity.
Key points for the Family Court Community:
* We discuss why and how all relevant aspects of the legal system shame and humiliate juveniles, and deprive juveniles
of dignity, whether in the civil commitment system, the criminal justice system, or the correctional system.
* We explain why this shame and humiliation disproportionately affects racial minorities and those who are economically impoverished.
* We discuss why the application of international human rights law and therapeutic jurisprudence can best remediate
this shame and humiliation.
Keywords:

Civil Commitment; Criminal Procedure; Dignity; International Human Rights Law; Juvenile Delinquency;
Therapeutic Jurisprudence;and Shame and Humiliation.

I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Supreme Court decisions declaring unconstitutional both capital punishment 2 and life
without parole3 in cases involving juveniles might lead a casual observer to think that we are now in
an era in which dignity of juveniles is privileged in the legal system, and in which humiliation and
4
shame are subordinated.4 This observation,
sadly, would be wrong. 5
Inquiries into a range of issues involving juveniles-commitment to psychiatric institutions; trials
in juvenile courts; aspects of criminal procedure that, in many jurisdictions, bar juveniles from raising the incompetency status or the insanity defense; waivers that allow juveniles (some younger than
fourteen) to be tried as adults; case law that has developed on the question of the validity of Miranda
waivers in juvenile cases; conditions in juvenile punishment facilities-reveal that, regularly,
juveniles are subject to shame and humiliation in all aspects of the legal system that relate to arrest,
trial, conviction and institutionalization, shame and humiliation that are often exacerbated in cases
involving racial minorities and those who are economically impoverished. As we will discuss
subsequently, we believe that these shaming and humiliating policies violate human rights law and
constitutional law and fly in the face of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) principles.
In this article, we discuss this wretched state of affairs and look to both TJ and international
human rights laws as approaches that should be relied upon to remediate the current state of affairs
and infuse this system with some badly needed dignity. 6 Although scholarship by judges concludes
that "[j]uvenile justice professionals should treat family members with dignity and respect," 7 it is
Correspondence: michael.perlin@nyls.edu; mlperlin@mdlpa.net

FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Vol. 56 No. 1, January 2018 79-99
© 2018 Association of Family and Conciliation Courts

80

FAMILY COURT REVIEW

clear that this is, more often than not, not the case. We believe that due process is an essential element of dignity and that this is abjectly absent in most aspects of the juvenile justice system and that
authentic dignity requires a genuine understanding of the individual before the court both as an
individual and in the context of their actions.
We believe that a turn to TJ-a school of thought that we discuss extensively below -requiring
that we focus on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being, 9 while mandating that inquiries into therapeutic outcomes do not mean that "therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil
rights and civil liberties," 10 is the best response to the current state of affairs. In this context, a system
that relies on shaming and humiliation" is utterly inimical to the bases of TJ. 12 If we embrace TJ,
shame and humiliation will diminish and greater dignity will be provided.
Remarkably, there is a paucity of recent legal scholarship available on much of what is discussed
in this article. 13 We hope that this article encourages others-judges, scholars, and policy makersto think carefully about the questions we address here and to weigh equally carefully the ultimate
impact that our current policies-drenched in shame and humiliation-have on the population in
question.
First, we discuss the meanings of shame and humiliation in these contexts and explain how the
practices of shaming and humiliation are even more troublesome in the context of cases involving
juveniles. 14 Next, we review the substantive relevant areas of the law: commitment to psychiatric
institutions1 5 and the multiple relevant aspects of the criminal process (related to juvenile courts,
matters related to questions of mental status, waivers of constitutional rights, waivers to adult courts,
and juvenile correctional facilities). 16 We then look carefully at the issues related to the employment
of TJ1 7 (including specifically, the relationship between TJ and problem-solving courts) 18 and international human rights, 19 then conclude with some modest suggestions.20

II. ON SHAME AND HUMILIATION
Shame is used as a modality to control behavior. 2 1 We believe that-together-humiliation and
shaming "contravene basic fundamental human rights." 22 In an earlier article with another colleague,
one of the coauthors (Perlin) has urged that "humiliating and shaming techniques be banned in order
to enhance dignity for society and the legal system." 23 Although juvenile justice issues were but one
subtopic of that piece,24 we believe that our ultimate conclusion there-that "the law regularly
shames and humiliates those who come before it" 25-will apply equally to an analysis of the range
of issues that we are discussing in this article. 26
Shaming practices lead to recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation, discourage treatment, and injure
victims. 27 Shame forces a downward redefinition of onesele; "the thrust of [shame's] aggression is

to dehumanize. "29 It is bordered by "embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification, in porous ways
that are difficult to predict or contain" 30 and is "one of the most important, painful and intensive of
all emotions." 31 Shaming is public; its dehumanization and social demotion occurs when a shameful
trait or act becomes "visible, and is exposed to others." 32 Shaming sanctions may be psychologically
debilitating. The director of a mental health program for juveniles has directly criticized the shaming
approach, stating that "[a]ll of our mental health programs end up having more and more people
come in with trauma at the hands of humiliation ...

the behavior [will] show up in different ways ...

[and] unfortunately, the morgue may see that person." 33
Humiliation has been broadly defined as "the rejection of human beings as human, that is, treating
people as if they were not human beings but merely things, tools, animals, subhuman, or inferior
humans."34 Humiliation can also reflect "a loss of control over one's identity"35 or "being denied a
certain status in communion with others." 36 The predictable response to humiliation is for its target
to "lash out at the humiliator" via a combination of anger and fear. 37 Aggression seems to be predictably, automatically, and at times uncontrollably activated in response to humiliation. 38 Studies show
the devastating consequences of systematic humiliation39 and demonstrate that humiliation may
cause depression, paranoia, violence, generalized and social anxiety, and suicide. 40 Importantly, in
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the context of the institutionalization of juveniles, shaming "exploits one's fear of shunning by
others, or banishment from the community."41
These impacts of shame and humiliation are equally, if not more, problematic for juveniles. Their
ongoing psychological development can be more heavily influenced by the negative reactions that
shame and humiliation are likely to evoke. Their brains continue to wire and rewire, whereas adults
have more stable neural connections; this could lead to greater internalization of shame and trauma
in the juvenile population. Both the civil and criminal legal processes to which juveniles are subject
are rife with policies and procedures that expose them to shame and humiliation, causing unnecessary trauma. We explore these processes below.

III. COMMITMENT TO PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles were entitled to less due process in the civil
commitment process than were adults 42 because counseled, due process precommitment hearings
would be little more than "time-consuming procedural minuets."43 Neither data nor theory was
offered by the Supreme Court in support of this assertion.4
That case-Parhamv. J.R.-discussed the state's interest "in not imposing procedural obstacles
45
that may discourage the mentally ill or their families from seeking needed psychiatric assistance."
This observation simultaneously assumed that (1) the persons at risk are genuinely mentally ill, (2)
they are in need of psychiatric assistance, and (3) such psychiatric assistance is available at the
institutions in question. 46 The Court continued that the risk of erroneous hospitalization was low,
because, according to the majority, "historically ... natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in
47
the best interests of their children."
Central to the Court's opinion in Parhamwas this thought: "The parens patriae interest in helping
parents care for the mental health of their children cannot be fulfilled if the parents are unwilling to
take advantage of the opportunities because the admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing
or too contentious." 48 However, no explanation is offered as to how the process is "too onerous, too
embarrassing, or too contentious," nor is there any basis suggested for the speculation that a significant percentage of patients would forgo state-provided hospital care if it is "contingent on participation in an adversary proceeding." 49 Further, Parham concluded:
Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption that parents act in
the best interests of their child. It is one thing to require a neutral physician to make a careful review of
the parents' decision in order to make sure it is proper from a medical standpoint; it is a wholly different
matter to employ an adversary contest to ascertain whether the parents' motivation is consistent with the
child's interests. 0
Again, no supporting citation, behavioral research, or reference to the court record is offered to bolster these assertions.
No modem U.S. Supreme Court civil case dealing with the rights of people with mental
disabilities has been criticized as consistently or as thoroughly as has Parham. The decision has
been criticized for the Court's "confusing and inaccurate" interpretations of the lower court
decisions, for "misstatements" of the factual record of the cases, 52 and-most importantly, for the
purposes of this article-for "according little weight to the juveniles' interest in self-respect." 53 Other
scholars flayed the opinion for improperly relying "on the technique of judicial notice to carve rather
elaborate, if one-sided, images of the functioning of American families, mental hospitals and judicial
55
proceedings," 54 concluding that it was premised on "erroneous assumptions of social fact."
Without supporting evidence, the chief justice "made no fewer than fifteen empirical assumptions,
many of them directly contrary to existing social-science research, about the psychology and
sociology of juvenile mental institutions" 56 and filled the opinion with social facts of questionable
veracity, accompanied by the authority to propel these facts into subsequent case law and, therefore,
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a spiral of less than rational legal policy making.5 7 The decision misused behavioral science in an
"unsophisticated and non-comprehensive manner for support of specific value positions."58
A fact not in evidence that is assumed in Parham is that adequate and ameliorative treatment
would be available to the juveniles committed to psychiatric institutions (and, by making it easier to
commit juveniles to such facilities, it is not unreasonable to assume that this was an end with which a
majority of the Supreme Court was comfortable). Yet, an evaluation of the constitutional right to
treatment cases-both individual and class action-litigated at such facilities belies this convenient
(and lazy) assumption. 59
Parham thus not only shames juveniles in the first instance by treating them as second-class
citizens (saying they are not due the same panoply of due process rights as are adults), but humiliates
them in the second instance by sanctioning their institutionalization in facilities that, by way of
example, sanctioned the use of "tear gas and other chemical crowd-control devices." 60

IV. THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. JUVENILE COURTS
As we will discuss below, we believe that the current system of juvenile justice-a system that is,
in virtually all respects, a dignity-free zone 6-betrays all that was good about the progressive ideals
of the early years of the juvenile justice system. Initially, juvenile courts were conceived of as places
where, "seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his
shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain
immensely in the effectiveness of his work." 62 These courts were conceived of as nonpunitive in
nature so as to "get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to save it
from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; ... to protect it from the stigma,this is the work [of the juvenile court] .63 Early legislation thus clarified that juvenile adjudication
could never be treated as a criminal conviction.64
The rationale for these attitudes flowed from the Progressive movement; progressives believed
that benevolent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills; they created agencies to
inculcate their middle-class values and to assimilate and "Americanize" immigrants and the poor to
become virtuous citizens like themselves. 65 Theoretically, a child's "best interests," background, and
welfare guided dispositions. Because a youth's offense was only a symptom of her "real" needs, sen66
tences were indeterminate, nonproportional, and potentially continued for the duration of minority.
Of course, there was another side to the same coin. In a typical case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that determinations of delinquency did not require due process because it is the "right of
the state to step in and save the child." 67 Thus, by the 1950s, commentators criticized this approach,
concluding that, "if the result of an adjudication of delinquency is substantially the same as a verdict
of guilty, the youngster has been cheated of his constitutional rights by false labeling." 68
And then came the 1960s. The Progressive Era consensus about state benevolence, the legitimacy of
imposing certain values on others, and what rehabilitation entailed had become matters of intense dispute. Pluralism, racial diversity, and cultural conflicts challenged the consensus about the goals of rehabilitation. Empirical evaluations of rehabilitation programs undermined Progressives' assumptions that
correctional personnel possessed the technical ability to treat offenders effectively. Further, perhaps
most importantly, civil rights advocates questioned the benevolence of justice system officials and
objected to the invidious and discriminatory consequences of discretionary decision making. 69 Thus,
"despite attempts to purge the term 'juvenile delinquent' of pejorative implications, it [came] to have as
70
much dramatic significance for community disapproval as the label-'criminal'-which it replaced."
At about the same time, the Supreme Court initially stepped in. In Kent v. United States, the
Supreme Court ruled that some procedural due process in judicial waiver hearings was required. Per
Justice Fortas, the Court reasoned that "[t]he child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
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for children." 72 Then, finally, in the next year, in Matter of Gault,7 3 the Court mandated procedural
safeguards in delinquency proceedings and focused initial judicial attention on whether the child
committed an offense as a prerequisite to sentencing. 74 Gault held that juvenile offenders were constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings because "a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be delinquent' and subjected to the loss
of his liberty for years is comparable, in seriousness, to a felony prosecution."7
In shifting the formal focus of juvenile courts from "real needs" to legal guilt, Gault identified
two crucial disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and reality: the theory versus practice of
rehabilitation and the differences between the procedural safeguards afforded adults and those available to juveniles. 76 These tensions remain, after fifty years, the heart of the controversies surrounding
juvenile courts.
And there is irony. We learned that providing a modicum of procedural justice legitimated greater
punitiveness in juvenile courts because once states granted even a semblance of procedural justice,
however inadequate, they more readily departed from a purely "rehabilitative" model of juvenile
-

justice.

77

By the early 1970s, both liberal and conservative critics of rehabilitation and indeterminate sentencing began to swing the penal policy pendulum toward retribution, determinate sentences, and
principles of "just deserts." As part of the "law of unintended consequences," "get tough" legislation
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in significant part, as a result of this focus on juveniles'
rights; its granting of procedural safeguards facilitated the increased severity of delinquency sanctions, precipitated the transformation of the juvenile court into a wholly owned subsidiary of the
criminal justice system, and legitimated the imposition of the punitive sentences that-not unimportantly-have fallen most heavily on minority offenders. 7 8 And as part of the denouement of Gault,
doubts about the ability of juvenile courts either to rehabilitate chronic and violent young offenders
or to protect public safety bolstered policies to crack down on youth crime and to prosecute larger
numbers of youths as adults. 79 Thus, in the 1980s and early 1990s, most states amended their juvenile codes either to simplify the transfer of young offenders to criminal courts or to require juvenile
court judges to impose longer, determinate, or mandatory sentences on those youths who remained
within an increasingly punitive juvenile system. 80
Not surprisingly, in recent years juvenile correctional facilities have become punitive and humiliating places, in many jurisdictions made worse by state laws that require juvenile court judges to
impose longer, determinate, or mandatory sentences on those youths who remained within that
These legislative strategies deemphasize rehabilitation and the circumstances of the
system.
offender, while they stress personal and justice system accountability and punishment. 82 Similarly,
state laws enabling juvenile transfer to adult court, mandatory minimum sentences, and reduced confidentiality provisions have continued to move the juvenile court farther away from the rehabilitative
ideal.83
There is no room for dignity in such proceedings. Making already bad matters worse, juvenilesincluding "exceptionally young juveniles"-are frequently shackled when they appear before the
court in juvenile proceedings, causing intense embarrassment and humiliation. 84 Such shackling
involves more than just pernicious physical and psychological effect, "it also affects a juvenile's
agency and dignity."85 Juveniles forced to appear in court shackled "suffer embarrassment and
86
humiliation and 'feel like captive animals.'
And this shackling is done without any evidence that the juveniles in question are a danger to anyone or a flight risk. 8 7 Consider the practice in Michigan:
Detained children routinely appear before Michigan's juvenile courts shackled with handcuffs, leg irons,
and belly chains. Once security officers bring a child to court in these shackles, the child usually remains
in them for her hearing or trial. In Michigan, as in many other states, no statute or court rule requires the
judge to decide whether shackles are necessary.
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Juveniles are robbed of their dignity in juvenile court proceedings in other ways as well. During
court proceedings, "a wide array of otherwise private, largely irrelevant, and prejudicial information
may be presented in court in a manner that can feel gratuitous, stigmatizing, and judgmental." 89 Not
only is this type of information "frequently irrelevant and gratuitously prejudicial, it shames youth
and diminishes their character in ways that go beyond the alleged delinquent act." 90 And such shaming may be counterproductive; it is likely to prevent the development of a healthy attitude toward
socially acceptable goals and activities. 9 1 In an earlier article, one of the coauthors (Perlin), writing
about the severe penalties for "teen sexting," 92 noted that "subjecting [juveniles] to a 'lifetime of
shame' is not consistent with the central aim of the juvenile justice system-rehabilitation."93

B. MENTAL STATE STATUSES AND DEFENSES 94
The criminal justice system has not made substantial efforts to clarify the application of the incompetency status to juveniles awaiting trial.95 In many jurisdictions, juveniles are barred from raising the
incompetency status or the insanity defense, and juveniles are typically presumed competent to stand
trial. 96 Some states even-astonishingly-preclude consideration ofjuveniles' competency by prohibiting mental health evaluations prior to the entry of delinquency adjudications. 97 Although in most states,
the standards for juvenile and adult competency are the same, 98 this must be contextualized with valid
and reliable findings that juveniles under the age of fifteen tended to perform at a level of impairment
consistent with that of adults who have been found incompetent to stand trial. 99 Importantly, although
some courts have mandated appropriate treatment for juveniles found incompetent to stand trial,1 00
"[1]ittle is known about the nature of [the] treatment" such juveniles actually receive.101
Multiple jurisdictions do not allow a juvenile to raise the insanity defense, 102 and most juvenile
justice jurisdictions "have never seen" an insanity defense. 103 This means that, in some states,
seriously mentally ill juveniles will be sent to juvenile (or adult) prisons, where their chances of
receiving any mental health treatment are minimal, at best. 104 Making already bad matters worse, at
least one court has held that a state postinsanity acquittal commitment statute was not to be applied
5
to cases in which juveniles had been found not guilty by reason of insanity.1 0
Extensive citations should not be necessary to support the assertion that severe mentally ill
juveniles will be shamed and humiliated in punishment facilities. 106 And there can be little question
that this issue will grow in importance in the future as evidence continues to accumulate that the
juvenile justice system is generally failing in its primary, articulated rehabilitative goal. 107

C. WAIVERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The best evidence tells us that juveniles of ages fourteen and under regularly demonstrate incompetence to waive their rights to silence and legal counsel.108 This conclusion is generally supported
across measures of both understanding and perception in our studies, and in relation to both absolute
and relative (adult norm) standards. 109
Thus, as a class, juveniles of ages fifteen and sixteen who have IQ scores of eighty or below lack
the requisite competence to waive their rights to silence and counsel. About one third to one half of
juveniles fifteen and sixteen years of age with IQ scores above eighty lack the requisite competence
to waive their rights when competence is defined by absolute standards (i.e., the satisfaction of scoring criteria for adequate understanding). As a class, however, this group demonstrates a level of
understanding and perception similar to that of seventeen- to twenty-one-year-old adults for whom
110
the competence to waive rights is presumed in law.
How does this play out in the specific context of Miranda waivers? This evidence is "particularly
disturbing when viewed in light of the disproportionate number of juveniles adjudicated delinquent
who have been diagnosed as learning disabled," 1 a population especially susceptible to confess
falsely to crimes they did not commit.112 As one of the authors (Perlin) has previously noted:
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Because the criminal justice system ignores the fact that juveniles may not be competent to stand trial and
the fact that they may not be criminally responsible, their opportunities for diversion to mental health
facilities are diminished. Because the system, in large part, shuts its eyes to the meaninglessness of
Miranda waivers (and subsequently countenances the conviction of confessing juveniles), even more
juveniles wind up in long-term detention facilities. When added to the data reported on above, the results
are especially toxic. 113

Such policies, again, lead to greater use of shaming and humiliating punishment facilities for juve1 14
niles with mental disabilities, ones that are "morally bereft."

D. WAIVERS TO ADULT COURTS

It is likely that this issue has both the most profound impact on juveniles in the justice system,
and leads-inexorably-to the most shaming and humiliation.1 1 5 The impact of juvenile waiver and
transfer policies is profound:
*
*
*

In all states, special proceedings are available to transfer youths under the usual age threshold from juvenile to criminal court.1 1 6
Judicial transfers require a hearing and findings as to the juvenile's "dangerousness" and
"amenability to treatment." 1 1 7
Statutory exclusion transfers and prosecutorial discretion transfers rarely include any consideration of the juvenile's psychological characteristics or mental state.1 18

Current policies rob the individual of dignity because, from the start, they fail to recognize that the
individual involved is more than the sum of his/her alleged criminal acts. The transfers that we refer to
here are often pretextuall1 9 and just as often done for "cosmetic purposes to create the impression or illusion that juvenile court is enforcing a 'get tough' policy." 120 Waivers are invariably based upon prosecutorial discretion; in those jurisdictions where there is automatic transfer, the sole emphasis is on the
underlying crime alleged to the near exclusion of consideration of the juvenile as a person.121 Transfer
appears to be counterproductive; transferred youths are more likely to reoffend, and to reoffend more
quickly and more often, than those retained in the juvenile justice system. 122 The data are clear; juveniles
incarcerated in adult institutions are "[five] times more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to
be beaten by staff, and 50% more likely to be attacked with a weapon than youth in juvenile facilities."
These conditions may be especially damaging for youths with mental disorders, who are almost eight
times more likely to commit suicide in adult jails than in juvenile institutions.123 In addition, fewer than
one third of juveniles institutionalized through the criminal justice system are in facilities that require
screening to be done by mental health professionals. 124 The conditions faced by juveniles in detention
and incarceration in adult facilities are dangerous, damaging, and life threatening.125 Stupefyingly, states
are expanding the scope of allegedly felonious behaviors by juveniles; in a law that went into effect on
January 1, 2017, schoolyard fights in Missouri may now be prosecuted as felonies. 126
Juveniles treated in adult facilities-thus subject to assault and sexual abuse-are regularly
shamed and humiliated simply by the reality of their institutionalization. 127

E. CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

What about the state of affairs of juvenile correctional facilities? In a prior article, one of the coauthors (Perlin) concluded:
Juvenile punishment and incarceration schemes are morally bereft. They subject the most at-risk population to unspeakably brutal conditions, they ignore the ubiquity of mental disabilities in this population,
and they provide few meaningful diversion programs.128
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This is not news, but it is incomprehensible how policy makers-judges, legislators, and prosecutors-have turned a blind eye to the, again, uncontradicted data. 129 We know-and have known for
years-that youths in the justice system are at high risk for mental health problems that may have
contributed to illegal behavior. 130 Sixty percent of male juvenile detainees and more than two-thirds
of female detainees meet diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric disorders (and these figures
probably reflect underestimations) 131; if, however, undetected learning disabilities are included, the
prevalence rate climbs to at least eighty percent. 132 In California, seventy percent of juveniles being
held in juvenile facilities "for mental health purposes" have attempted suicide. 133 In short, most
states are barely able to ensure the physical safety of their juvenile inmates; "inhumane conditions of
confinement ... and inadequate rehabilitative services" are still common. 134
While the mental fragility of youths and the perils it presents for their confinement is well documented, 135 so too are the instances of physical mistreatment in juvenile facilities. Criminological
research, judicial opinions, and investigative studies report staff beatings of inmates, the use of medications for social control purposes, extensive reliance on solitary confinement, and a virtual absence
of meaningful rehabilitative programs.136 Reports on vile conditions of confinement surpass-by a
large margin 37-the "shock the conscience" standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
stomach-pumping case of Rochin v. California.138
The treatment of juvenile offenders not only causes significant trauma in cases like those referenced above, but it also enforces systematic shame and humiliation, which become a regular part of
confinement for these children. Enduring the abuse and having others witness the abuse regularly
subjects these juveniles to shame and humiliation that they will continue to internalize. This psychological trauma at the hands of so-called caretakers will ultimately cause harm to these children and
very likely have a negative effect on what should be a rehabilitative environment.139
We believe that TJ is an important lens through which to view these issues. TJ allows us to recognize the legal, social, and psychological complexities that shame and humiliation can trigger. It is
also critical to recognize the role of international human rights laws in this discussion. Many nations
have specific regulations that deal extensively with treatment of juveniles and juvenile offenders, and
this will be an important tool in linking the inadequacies of our current system with ways in which
we may be able to improve. 140

V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
A. BACKGROUND 141
TJ142 "look[s] at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 143 and assesses law's influence on
"emotional life and psychological well-being." 144 TJ mandates that "law should value psychological
health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when
consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness." 14 5
The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or
should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. 146 On this point, we agree fully with Professor Nigel Stobbs that "[t]he claim that TJ poses any
147
threat to due process rights ... is simply unsustainable."
From TJ, we gain "a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into
the law and its applications." 148 TJ is "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law ... a
movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law ... [emphasizing]
150
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 149 It thus supports an ethic of care.
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation, and voluntariness,151 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell
their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge
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from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they
voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future.
In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in,
their own decisions. 15 2

The question we must confront is this: do our practices related to the treatment of juveniles in the
civil commitment and criminal justice system comport with the "3 V's" seen by Professor Ronner as
the sine qua nons of TJ? As we discuss below, we believe the answer is, sadly, "absolutely not."

B. TJ AND JUVENILES

There is a limited database of TJ literature (and some case law) on the questions of whether juveniles have a right to counsel in civil commitment hearings, 153 of the extent of rights to be granted to
foster children in juvenile and family court proceedings, 154 the civil commitment trial itself, 15 5 the
implications of TJ for juvenile cases involving Miranda issues, 156 the need for coordination between
juvenile justice and mental health systems, 157 and the waiver/transfer issue. 15 8 But there has beenother than a piece written by one of the coauthors of this article 159-nothing on the relationship
between TJ and issues of juvenile mental status defense or juvenile punishment schemes. Also, it is
more troubling that, with the exception of this latter piece, none of the articles referred to have been
written in the past decade. 160
Differences between juveniles and adults need to be taken into account to create a truly therapeutic
environment. Juveniles cannot be treated as smaller adults; advocates need to tailor their advocacy
approach, both in and out of the courtroom, to working with a juvenile population. 16 1 This means
learning to work with the individual and providing explanations at the level they are able to understand, 162 as well as recognizing that it may be necessary to work within a family structure, including
163
the child's support system in discussions or decisions.
Recognizing and acknowledging juvenile brain development in the context of sentencing and
potential rehabilitation programs: it is a well-established fact that juvenile brain development is
ongoing until at least age twenty-five. 164 As part of a TJ approach to dealing with juvenile cases,
advocates need to be aware of why a more traditional route of punishment, such as prison sentences
or programs without juvenile-focused therapy or treatment will be ineffective, and potentially detrimental to psychological development, for this population. 165
In practice, this type of intervention, with emphasis on the therapeutic benefits of assigning counsel and treating juveniles as a discrete category, would likely have a transformative effect on the decisions in many juvenile cases. With less of an emphasis on punishment and deterrence, and with an
eye toward treatment and rehabilitation, TJ-inclined appointed counsel would likely have a greater
impact in cases where interventional services would potentially benefit the juvenile. Judges may also
be more likely to consider diversion based on arguments from counsel, taking into account background, mental health history, and support from family when considering placement options. Ultimately, a practice of assigning counsel that understands both the legal and therapeutic benefits that
these types of hearings can have for the juvenile could dramatically change the landscape in a number of jurisdictions where formulaic punishments and sentences are handed out; such a change in
practice would pay due regard to the individual qualities that should be taken into account in each
separate case, presented in order to provide the most effective representation of each individual.

1. On Intersectionality

1

6

It is essential that TJ principles be followed in all cases in which juveniles are involved (individuals who may not be as able as some to counteract the biases they face). Advocates must recognize
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the intersecting issues of one's juvenile status, as well as potential issues of race, class, gender, and
mental health status when working with an individual on a juvenile case. 167 Judges and juries will
often unconsciously use these markers in their decision making, so advocates need to be proactive in
recognizing and fighting the biases.

2. On Mental Health Courts
How does TJ relate to problem-solving courts? 168 Such TJ-based courts handle a wide array of
issues, ranging from family problems and domestic violence to substance abuse and mental health
concerns.169 These courts draw together the efforts of legal and mental health professionals to fashion
treatment plans and supervision models. 170 In them, judges seek to facilitate creative solutions to the
issues presented by each individual offender, encouraging defendants to complete treatment plans in
the hopes of increasing compliance with programs tailored to ensure that individuals will avoid the
justice system in the future.1 7 1
Problem-solving juvenile courts universally strive to use both consequences and incentives in
treatment and recovery plans and focus on "the role and functioning of the youth's family in terms of
rehabilitating the youth." 172 Ostensibly, the juvenile justice system-an institution designed to treat
and rehabilitate youth-offers a unique opportunity to intervene in the lives of children with mental
disabilities before any negative behavioral or psychological patterns take hold. Although the procedures employed by courts may vary, all appear to focus on the importance of developing individualized treatment programs for offenders and returning to the rehabilitative ideal. 173 In this context, the
juvenile mental health court 1 74 may offer some innovative and transformative remediation to the
current state of affairs in which juveniles are trapped in court and administrative proceedings in
which dignity and due process are sorely lacking.
There are now, according to the Council of State Governments' Justice Center, over 375 such
courts in operation in the United States. 175 The research literature tells us that both of the primary
mental health court goals-reduced criminal justice involvement and increased community treatment-were met.176 Participants had significantly lower arrest rates after enrollment than before
enrollment and lower postenrollment arrest rates than comparison groups. Importantly, these courts
were more successful at reducing recidivism-recidivism rates of twenty-five percent versus ten to
fifteen percent-than were drug courts. 1 7 7 In a comprehensive analysis of one such court in
Colorado, researchers found that results "clearly support the efficacy of the Colorado First Judicial
District's juvenile mental health court for reducing both recidivism while in the program and during
at least [one] year following successful completion." 1 7 8 There also is preliminary evidence that postrelease recidivism rates of youth in the court were significantly lower than those for a sample of other
youth in the juvenile justice system diagnosed with mental disorders. 179

3. In Summary
TJ teaches us that the types of interventions employed by problem-solving courts-especially in
matters involving juvenile offenders and other vulnerable populations-are extremely beneficial in
not only stopping a pattern of problematic behavior and helping to promote better mental health but
also in working to ensure that there is less of a chance for these juveniles to face the shame and
humiliation that they may otherwise have endured in a secure facility or treatment center.
"One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a commitment to dignity."ISO In a
recent article about dignity and the civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and
Stephen Rosenbaum embrace TJ as a modality of analysis and focus specifically on this issue of
voice: "When procedures give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect,
decisions are explained to them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less
coercion." 181 If we embrace the dignity-enhancing principles of TJ-both in traditional courts and in

Perlin and Lynch/BRINGING DIGNITY TO JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS

89

problem-solving courts 182-we enhance the likelihood that shame and humiliation will diminish and
that greater dignity will be provided. 183
C. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

There is a rich body of literature that discusses the intersection between international human rights
law and the Supreme Court's death penalty and life without parole (LWOP) decisions as they apply
to juveniles. 184 Most of this literature focuses on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child's
prohibition of "torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 1 8 5 We
believe, though, that it is necessary to extend our focus beyond these questions, and specifically
consider the potential impact of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD)186 on the population in question.
Briefly, the CRPD is unique because it is the first legally binding instrument devoted to the
comprehensive protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, a category that includes most
juveniles in the psychiatric commitment system and many juveniles in the criminal justice system.188
It not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with disabilities, but it also
explicitly sets out the many steps that states must take to create an enabling environment so that
persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society. 189 When we consider some of the
realities of the juvenile correctional facility data-that two thirds of all incarcerated juveniles have a
mental disorder1 90 ;that minorities are "disproportionately" locked up in juvenile detention facilities1 9 1; that staff beatings of inmates; the use of medications for social control purposes, extensive
reliance on solitary confinement, and a virtual absence of meaningful rehabilitative programs are all
common 192 -it is clear that we must confront the fact that conditions in these facilities, globally,
violate international human rights laws and standards. 193 We believe that these international human
rights instruments do have the potential to neutralize and/or mediate punitive trends in juvenile
law. 194 However, there has been little movement to actualize this potential. Certainly, the needs to
examine, understand, and expand the relationship between international human rights and all aspects
of TJ are essential. 195
Although many of the post-Roper/Grahamcases signaled a "greater willingness to consider international human rights standards and practices when assessing sentencing practices within the United
States," it is still unclear whether the Supreme Court will continue to analyze cases with any attention
paid to international human rights. However, it does seem clear that the Court has begun to establish
a trend of acknowledging that juveniles need to be treated differently, which falls in line with intema196
tional human rights standards, even if that is not the direct intention of the Court.
The United States has signed, but not yet ratified, the CRPD. Under such circumstances, "a state's
obligations under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ... which
requires signatories 'to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention's] object and
purpose."'197 Domestic courts in New York have thus cited the CRPD approvingly in cases
involving guardianship matters. In one such case, Surrogate Judge Kristin Booth Glen noted that the
CRPD was "entitled to 'persuasive weight' in interpreting our own laws and constitutional
protections." 198 Thus, it is entirely appropriate for judges in domestic cases involving any of the
substantive topics we have written about in this article to consider this body of the law.

VI. CONCLUSION
Our treatment of juveniles-in the civil commitment process, in all aspects of juvenile delinquency cases, in waiver proceedings, and in institutional settings-shames and humiliates them, robs
them of their dignity, and violates the essence of TJ. Although recent U.S. Supreme Court cases-by
drawing on international human rights precedents-appear to augur a new day in this area of law and
policy, the on-the-ground reality shows that this is still, at this point in time, highly aspirational. We
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believe that a conscious turn toward TJ and a greater emphasis on international human rights law
may, finally, bring about a new day for all concerned. 199
Our title for this article, She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can't Touch Her at All comes from Bob
Dylan's 1965 hit, She Belongs to Me. 2 00 One of the many interpretations of the lyric suggests, "The
girl has the freedom of the world-which only the young have. And yet she belongs to the adult in
her life." 20 1 Juveniles enmeshed in the civil commitment and juvenile delinquency systems lose out
on the "freedom of the world." The adult in their life is the state. We hope that the application of TJ
principles and international human rights precepts can help change that state of affairs.
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